The AKP seeks to frame the PKK’s statement as surrender, while pro-government media continues to target the opposition.
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, much like its predecessors, has not refrained from resorting to special warfare methods against society. In fact, it would not be wrong to say that it has performed even worse than those before it in this regard.
Despite a century of republican experience and the wealth of institutional knowledge within the state, the AKP has managed to use state resources for its own benefit more skillfully than the members of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). In this context, it is often said that they have made even the notorious actions of the Gülen Movement seem mild by comparison.
It is clear that methods have been employed which leave many stunned in disbelief. Particularly in recent times, the developments unfolding in this area are far more striking than before and deserve close attention.
As is known, the judiciary under the AKP has made a sudden decision to suspend the broadcasts of two television channels, Halk TV and Sözcü TV, that are known to operate in line with the CHP. According to available information, both channels are expected to be taken off the air on the evening of July 8. Unless there is a last-minute change of decision, neither will be broadcasting on July 9.
Naturally, this news brings to mind previous government decisions and policies targeting the free press, even though Halk TV and Sözcü TV may not fully fall into that category.
For example, in the 1990s, it is well documented that the state attempted to silence the free press by directly murdering journalists and bombing newspaper offices. The newspaper Özgür Gündem and the tradition that followed it serve as concrete examples. Dozens of writers, reporters, editors, and distributors were murdered; newspapers were shut down, and every method was used to prevent them from publishing.
Journalists and press workers such as Musa Anter, Metin Göktepe, Hüseyin Deniz, Cengiz Altun, Hafız Akdemir, Nazım Babaoğlu, Ferhat Tepe, Adıl Başkan, Yahya Yaşa, Halil Adanır, and Orhan Karaağar were among the hundreds deliberately targeted and murdered during this period.
This era can be described as a time when the free press was subjected to physical attacks and outright assassinations.
2002–2010: The era of controlled repression
Undoubtedly, attacks against the free press continued during the rule of the AKP. The period between 2002 and 2010, however, carries a unique character. These were the years when the AKP portrayed itself as pro-European Union and relatively democratic, essentially marketing itself here and there as a “libertarian” party.
Various “initiatives” were constantly on the agenda: the Kurdish initiative, the Alevi initiative, the Roma initiative, and so on. Yet behind the scenes, a very different mechanism was in motion. There was a deliberate effort to silence the free press. The main method was to obstruct media outlets through the instrumentalization of the legal system.
Due to the European Union accession process and similar concerns, directly targeting or arresting journalists was limited. However, attacks against the free press continued in different forms. The most common method was to suspend publications or shut them down entirely through court rulings.
A long list can be compiled of the publications that were attacked, obstructed, or shut down during that period. The reason for presenting this list is as follows: the AKP’s early years are often portrayed in society as a period in which freedoms were expanded and democratic space was opened. However, the reality tells quite the opposite story. Some of the publications targeted during this so-called liberal era include:
Yeniden Özgür Gündem (2 September 2002 – 28 February 2004), Ülkede Özgür Gündem (1 March 2004 – 16 November 2006), Toplumsal Demokrasi (16 November 2006 – 5 January 2007), Gündem (17 January 2007 – 16 December 2007), Güncel (19 March – 17 October 2007), Yaşamda Gündem (9 March – 12 March 2007),
Gerçek Demokrasi (October – 21 November 2007), Yedinci Gün (5 November 2007 – 8 October 2008), Yaşamda Demokrasi (15 December 2007 – 4 April 2008), Toplumsal Demokrasi 2 (22 December 2007 – 25 February 2008), Öteki Bakış (31 March – 4 April 2008), Yeni Bakış (14 April – 8 May 2008), Alternatif (19 May 2008 – 20 October 2009), Gelecek (28 May – 27 September 2008), Özgür Ülke (30 September – 1 October 2008), Gerçek (12 – 18 October 2008), Ülkeye Bakış (12 – 18 October 2008), the weekly newspaper Yeni Mezopotamya (22 October 2008), Politika (22 October 2008 – 14 February 2009), Analiz (8 November 2008 – 28 February 2009), Ayrıntı (29 November 2008 – 28 March 2009), Özgür Yorum (21 December 2008 – 14 March 2009), and Günlük (9 January 2009 – 4 April 2011).
Özgür Gündem was relaunched on 4 April 2011; on 24 March 2012, it was shut down for 30 days, and the newspapers printed at the printing house the following day were confiscated. Özgür Mezopotamya (11 April 2009) received three separate shutdown orders, each lasting 39 days. Özgür Görüş (18 April 2009) was issued four separate shutdown orders, each for 30 days. Süreç (13 June 2009) was shut down once for 15 days and twice for 30 days. Özgür Halk Tavrı (20 June 2009) was banned for 39 days. Siyasi Alternatif (6 June 2009) faced two shutdown orders, each lasting 30 days.
Özgür Ortam (27 June 2009) received two shutdown orders, each lasting 30 days. Haftalık Yorum (7 February 2010) was ordered to be confiscated for 30 days. Yorum (27 March 2010) was banned twice, each time for 30 days. Politik Yorum (3 April 2010) received one shutdown order lasting 39 days. Ülkede Yorum (20 April 2010) was banned for 30 days. Demokratik Açılım (26 August 2009) was subjected to a 38-day shutdown order.
Post-2010: The brazenness of power
The period following 2010 marks a distinct shift. This was when the AKP secured its position through the constitutional referendum, and the steps it took from then on reflected that confidence. In 2011, under what was called the “KCK Press Case,” a large-scale wave of arrests targeted journalists in Northern Kurdistan (Bakur) and Turkey, journalists who, in many ways, upheld the dignity of the profession. Dozens were detained, many were imprisoned, and numerous media outlets were shut down.
The arrested journalists were kept in prison for years based on indictments lacking any substantive content, in an attempt to silence dissenting voices. Although some were released in 2014 under the influence of the ongoing political process, their return to journalism was short-lived. In 2015, the collapse of the peace process, and in 2016, the staged coup attempt, opened the door to a new wave of repression against the free press. Dozens of TV channels, newspapers, magazines, news agencies, radio stations, and digital platforms were shut down.
Among those closed were IMC TV, Azadi TV, Özgür Gün TV, Van TV, Jiyan TV, Özgürlükçü Demokrasi newspaper, Azadiya Welat newspaper, Radyo Ses, Radyo Rengin, and Radyo Karacadağ, to name just a few.
It should also be noted that during this period, the assets of the closed media outlets were confiscated, an act that amounts to outright legal plunder. Even after more than a decade, the confiscated properties of these outlets have still not been returned to their rightful owners.
The darkest period
The period from 2016 to the present can be described as the darkest era under the current government. During this time, journalism in the true sense of the word and independent broadcasting have been effectively banned. No media outlet outside of those aligned with the government has been allowed to operate. In place of yesterday’s “military-backed media,” a new palace-controlled media structure has been constructed. Although this policy suffered a significant blow with the local elections held in 2024, it has continued to exist in a more subtle form to this day.
In this period, not only the free Kurdish press but the entire opposition media has been targeted by the government. Media outlets affiliated with the CHP, perhaps for the first time in the history of the republic, have been subjected to such an intense campaign of intimidation and suppression.
At present, the government has declared war not only on traditional media but also on digital platforms that are equally influential. Posts made on platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook are now considered grounds for prosecution. Even the simplest statement or post criticizing the government can result in immediate arrest and imprisonment. Fatih Altaylı, even though he is widely known as someone aligned with the deep state, is among those who have been detained under this crackdown.
What is the AKP’s objective?
Undoubtedly, every time the government has attacked the free and opposition press, it has had a specific objective and if it is attacking now, it has one again. In 2016, after targeting the Free Press and shutting down all media outlets, the government immediately turned to civil society organizations, associations, and foundations, silencing them as well. That was not enough. It then targeted the leadership of political parties. A wave of repression was launched to ensure that not a single person engaged in political activity or production remained untouched. Thousands of influential and authorized individuals within political party leaderships and municipalities were arrested and imprisoned. A significant number of them remain behind bars to this day.
Through this strategy, the government aimed to silence opposition voices in both the media and politics, to eliminate them if possible and thus win over the majority of society. However, when looking at the situation today, it is clear that this goal has not been achieved. The most-watched media outlets in Turkey are those that oppose the government. This fact is confirmed by both public opinion polling data and the mood on the streets.
Naturally, this leads to a pressing question: Why now? Why is the government moving to black out Halk TV and Sözcü TV? What does it not want people to see? What is it trying to hide from the public?
What is the connection between blacking out Halk TV and Sözcü TV and the ongoing process?
There will certainly be different interpretations; other reasons can no doubt be proposed. For instance, such a move may have been taken, at least temporarily, to cover up the truth in preparation for a broader operation against the CHP.
However, the fact that the broadcasts of both television channels are being suspended specifically on Tuesday evening seems to carry a particular significance. As is known, the main topic in the media these days is the expected disarmament of PKK members. Zagros Hiwa, spokesperson for the KCK Press Office, recently stated that this step, described as a declaration of intent, is expected to be made within a few days, specifically between 10 and 12 July.
Meanwhile, Halk TV and Sözcü TV are being taken off the air from the evening of 8 July until the morning of 9 July. It is clear that there is a link between these two developments. Seeing and interpreting this connection is not difficult.
The real question, or rather, the issue that requires analysis, is why the government specifically does not want these two media outlets to report on the ceremony and the discussions that will follow. It is well known that these two channels have strongly criticized the AKP for the way it has handled the ongoing process. In fact, they have frequently “stoned” it, so to speak. It is also clear that, at times, they operate with a classic anti-Kurdish reflex and present a traditionally Kemalist stance.
But is this alone the reason for the suspension decision? Is it only to prevent criticism of the AKP? Or are there other motives at play?
For example, could it be that there is fear these two outlets, however limited, might actually reflect what is happening as it is? It is well known that the AKP is attempting to frame the expected announcement as an act of “surrender” and is working hard to present it that way. However, the PKK insists that this is not the case and that the process will move forward through reciprocal steps from both sides. Naturally, the resulting public image may not align with what AKP circles want to see.
One might recall how the AKP-aligned media initially chose to ignore the Kurdish National Unity Conference held in Qamishlo. But when the CHP-aligned media reported on the conference and its outcomes from their own perspective, the AKP media was forced to cover it as well and soon after, launched its attacks.
It seems a similar fear is at play again today. Time will tell.
Ultimately, it is not possible to separate these broadcast bans from the broader political process currently underway. The AKP-MHP government wants everything, including the media, to remain under its control. It seeks to prevent any dissenting views or alternative perspectives from reaching the public. Clearly, at a time when discussions around democracy and peace are at their most intense, the policy being followed is one of uniformity, self-centeredness, and authoritarianism
